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Antidiscrimination Statutes and Women-Only 
Spaces in the #MeToo Era 
Anna Porter† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In response to the #MeToo Movement, many organizations began 
attempting to find creative ways to address the realities people who 
identify as women face both at work and in public spaces.1 These organ-
izations often focus on closing the gender pay gap and increasing repre-
sentation in leadership, both indicators tied to sexual harassment in 
the workplace.2 Although the organizations discussed below are open to 
female-identifying and non-binary people, they exclude men.3 Organi-
zations argue that providing women-only events “offer forums for dis-
cussing discrimination, a haven for people who may feel excluded by the 
dominant culture of broader professional groups, and career advance-
ment opportunities for demographics at a statistical disadvantage.”4 
From co-working spaces to empowerment seminars to women-only 
showings of Wonder Woman, the popularity of these spaces suggests 
that women respond to the idea of having a space where they know they 
 
 †  B.A. 2011, Bellarmine University; M.A. 2015, University of Florida; J.D. Candidate 2020, 
The University of Chicago Law School. Many thanks to Professor Aziz Huq for his guidance and 
feedback. I would also like to thank the past and present staff of The University of Chicago Legal 
Forum for their support and comments. 
 1 Leigh Stringer, Where is the Demand for Women-Only Co-Working Spaces Coming From?, 
SLATE (May 17, 2018), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/05/the-wing-demand-for-women-onl 
y-co-working-spaces-is-high.html [https://perma.cc/S8MZ-H63Q]. 
 2 See Jennifer Calfas, Inside Sexual Harassment’s Hidden Toll on Equal Pay, TIME (April 9, 
2018), http://time.com/5227742/sexual-harassment-equal-pay-wage-gap; Karen Higginbottom, Th-  
e Link Between Power and Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, FORBES (June 11, 2018), https://w 
ww.forbes.com/sites/karenhigginbottom/2018/06/11/the-link-between-power-and-sexual-harassm 
ent-in-the-workplace/#487cd27b190f [https://perma.cc/8R9D-3HA8]. 
        3  In discussing women-only spaces, this Comment is not referring to events held by Trans-
Exclusionary Radical Feminists. 
 4 Christina Cauterucci, Members of a Men’s Rights Group Sued a Women’s Networking Group 
for Sex Discrimination, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2016), https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/01/members-
of-a-men-s-rights-group-sued-a-women-s-networking-group-for-sex-discrimination.html [https://p 
erma.cc/RZZ8-GXFU]. 
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will only be surrounded by other women.5 However, because these ini-
tiatives are by nature segregated by gender (excluding men), they risk 
coming into contact with state antidiscrimination statutes.6 For this 
reason, many of these organizations have recently come under fire by 
men bringing charges of discrimination.7 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which addresses discrimina-
tion in public accommodations, does not include sex or gender as a pro-
tected category.8 Because there is no national standard with respect to 
sex discrimination in public accommodations, plaintiffs rely on state 
statutes in the majority of these cases.9 The amount of protection af-
forded by various states changes depending upon “legislative defini-
tions and judicial interpretations of what constitutes a public accommo-
dation.”10 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act is one example of an 
expansive antidiscrimination statute.11 Enacted by the California legis-
lature in 1959 as an amendment to the Civil Code, the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act prohibits California businesses from discriminating based 
on protected characteristics.12 Sex was added as a protected character-
istic through a 1974 amendment to the law.13 
While the tension between sex-segregated spaces and laws prohib-
iting discrimination is not new, in the past the vast majority of these 
lawsuits targeted men-only organizations (and laws prohibiting it envi-
sioned men-only organizations discriminating against women).14 Today, 
male plaintiffs in California suing women’s organizations for sex dis-
crimination argue that these cases should not be treated any differently 
than other cases of discrimination brought under the Unruh Act.15 The 
 
 5 Stringer, supra note 1. 
 6 Rebecca Gale, When Men Sue Women’s Empowerment Orgs for Gender Discrimination, SLA-  
TE (July 3, 2018), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/07/men-are-suing-womens-empowerment 
-organizations-for-gender-discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/EGB8-W7VA]. 
 7 Id. 
 8 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. 
 9 Jessica E. Rank, Is Ladies’ Night Really Sex Discrimination?: Public Accommodation Laws, 
De Minimis Exceptions, and Stigmatic Injury, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 223, 225 (2005). This Com-
ment refers to sex discrimination, rather than gender discrimination, in keeping with the way 
legislatures and the courts use the term. The statute at issue in California clarifies that “sex” 
includes gender identity and gender expression. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(e)(5). 
 10 Marissa L. Goodman, A Scout is Morally Straight, Brave, Clean, Trustworthy . . . and Het-
erosexual? Gays in the Boy Scouts of America, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 825, 830 (1999). 
 11 Cal. Civ. Code § 51. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Jean Douglas Murphy, Women’s Rights Legislation—A Vintage Year, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 
1974, at H1. 
 14 Deborah Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 NW. U.L. REV. 106, 114 (1986). 
 15 Complaint at 3, Rich Allison v. Red Door Epicurean, LLC, No. 2017-00036282, Cal. Super. 
Ct. (2017) (“For a business operating in the progressive state of California, in the year 2017, to 
provide accommodations, advantages, privileges, or services to only female patrons, is as repug-
nant and unlawful as businesses being involved in a “Caucasian Night” or a “Heterosexual Night” 
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extent to which a California court would agree is as yet unclear, as or-
ganizations to this point have settled these cases rather than face ex-
pensive legal defense fees.16 
This Comment will analyze the application of California’s Unruh 
Civil Rights Act to women-only organizations and events in the #MeToo 
Era. California provides an especially interesting case study because of 
the wide protections against discrimination under its civil rights law. 
In part because discrimination under the law is per se injurious, there 
is a plethora of available cases to review.17 Further, in the past few 
years, several California men have brought lawsuits against women’s 
empowerment organizations for hosting women-only events. Given the 
current appeal of these types of organizations, as well as the media at-
tention on #MeToo, it is an interesting time to engage in a discussion 
about the scope of state antidiscrimination statutes and the ways courts 
might or should apply the law to these new organizations. As California 
has such broad protections, outlining more clearly the scope of the law 
and providing strategies for ways to defend against allegations is im-
portant for organizations seeking to promote women’s empowerment. 
Further, as the statute’s protections are broad, it can serve as an exam-
ple for other state legislatures and courts. 
Part II of this Comment will track the jurisprudence surrounding 
the Unruh Act in order to highlight how California courts have inter-
preted the law in cases of sex discrimination claims to this point. Part 
III will look to the purpose of the Unruh Act to analyze whether the 
California legislature contemplated these types of suits under the law. 
The law has primarily expanded to protect different identified margin-
alized groups. The fact that it might be wielded by more privileged 
groups against organizations seeking to promote gender equality high-
lights potential inconsistencies with the Unruh Act and its application. 
Part IV will argue that courts in California should follow Supreme 
Court jurisprudence in Fourteenth Amendment cases, limiting applica-
tion to discrimination that perpetuates irrational stereotypes. Finally, 
Part V will suggest a legislative alternative to judicial action, carving 
out an exception to the Unruh Act for remedial actions taken by histor-
ically marginalized groups. 
 
and denying admission and discounted drinks and other accommodations, advantages, privileges, 
or services to patrons of color or to gay or lesbian patrons, respectively.”). 
 16 Rebecca Gale, When Men Sue Women’s Empowerment Orgs for Gender Discrimination, SLA-  
TE (July 3, 2018), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/07/men-are-suing-womens-empowerment 
-organizations-for-gender-discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/EGB8-W7VA]. 
 17 Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 33 (1985) (“[B]y passing the Unruh Act, the Legis-
lature established that arbitrary sex discrimination by businesses is per se injurious.”) 
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II. JURISPRUDENCE SURROUNDING THE UNRUH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
This section will first consider California courts’ interpretation of 
the Unruh Act and the way that interpretation has been used in the 
past to combat discrimination against women in places of public accom-
modation. Most of the early cases of sex discrimination in California 
involve women seeking access to men-only spaces. This section will 
show how the courts in California expanded the definition of “business 
establishments” to include things like a nonprofit Boys’ Club18 and the 
Rotary Club,19 but not the Boy Scouts of America20 or a local private 
high school.21 This sometimes-fine line the courts have drawn makes it 
potentially difficult for defendants to know when they might be subject 
to provinces of the Unruh Act. The section then turns to cases brought 
over the past decades by men against businesses offering promotions to 
women, largely in the form of “Ladies’ Night” discounts. Finally, it con-
siders recent examples of men suing organizations that host women’s 
empowerment events. 
A.  California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act and “Business Establish-
ments” 
Enacted in 1959, the Unruh Civil Rights Act provides broad protec-
tions against discrimination. As most recently amended in 2015, the 
Unruh Act currently provides: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and 
equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ances-
try, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic infor-
mation, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary 
language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and 
equal accommodations, advantages, privileges, or services in all 
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.22 
The Unruh Act provides a private cause of action and either a maximum 
of three times the actual damages or statutory damages of at least 
 
 18 Ibister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985). 
 19 Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. Of Dirs., 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, aff’d Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary 
Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
 20 Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 952 P.2d 218, 237 (Cal. 1998). 
 21 Doe v. California Lutheran High Sch. Assn., 170 Cal. App. 4th 828, 838 (2009). 
 22 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b); The Act further clarifies that “‘Sex’ includes, but is not limited to, 
pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth. ‘Sex’ also includes, 
but is not limited to, a person’s gender. ‘Gender’ means sex, and includes a person’s gender identity 
and gender expression. ‘Gender expression’ means a person’s gender-related appearance and be-
havior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.” CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 51(e)(5). 
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$4,000 for each violation.23 It further allows a court to award attorney’s 
fees to prevailing plaintiffs.24 
To avoid First Amendment concerns related to the freedom of pri-
vate association, state statutes follow the Supreme Court in providing 
exceptions for private clubs.25 They prohibit discrimination only in 
places of public accommodation, which is defined slightly differently 
from state to state.26 The Supreme Court has noted that the First 
Amendment “afford[s] constitutional protection to freedom of associa-
tion in two distinct senses.”27 First, the Court has held that individuals 
are protected in their intimate or private relationships.28 In order to 
determine whether a given relationship qualifies for this type of protec-
tion, the Court looks to “factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and 
whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship.”29 
Second, the Court has defined the rights of individuals to expressive 
association, “to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of po-
litical, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”30 In 
attempting to square First Amendment freedom of association concerns 
with state public accommodation statutes prohibiting discrimination, 
the Supreme Court uses a balancing test that weighs “the infringement 
upon a group’s right to freedom of expressive association against the 
state’s compelling interest in eradicating and preventing discrimina-
tion.”31 
The Unruh Act prohibits discrimination “in all business establish-
ments of any kind whatsoever.”32 In interpreting this language, Califor-
nia courts have recognized a legislative “intent to use the term ‘business 
establishments’ in the broadest sense reasonably possible.”33 In keeping 
with First Amendment freedom of association rights, the California Su-
preme Court has concluded that the provisions of the Unruh Act “do not 
apply to the membership decisions of a truly private social club.”34 
Although “truly private” clubs are not subject to the Unruh Act, 
merely stating that a club is private does not preclude enforcement of 
 
 23 Id. at § 52(a). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Goodman, supra note 10. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 546, citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 30 Id. at 549. 
 31 Goodman, supra note 10. 
 32 CAL. CIV. CODE §51(b). 
 33 Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 896 P.2d 776, 786 (1995). 
 34 Id. at 791. 
502 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019 
the Unruh Act against it.35 The California Supreme Court faced the is-
sue of the application of the Unruh Act to “private” clubs when a woman 
sued a nonprofit private country club in Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & 
Country Club.36 There, the court discussed the legislative history of the 
Unruh Act and concluded that the term “business establishment” was 
designed “to include any entity that would have been considered a ‘place 
of public accommodation or amusement’ under the pre-1959 version of 
section 51.”37 As private social clubs were typically excluded from public 
accommodation statutes based on First Amendment freedom of associ-
ation rights, the court determined that they would similarly be excluded 
under the Unruh Act, so long as they “are genuinely selective in their 
membership and in which the relationship among members is continu-
ous, personal, and social.”38 That is, an entity does not avoid liability 
under the Unruh Act simply by naming itself a private social club. In 
Warfield, although the nonprofit country club at issue purported to be 
a private social club, the court determined that it was a “business es-
tablishment” subject to the Unruh Act because of its “regular business 
transactions with nonmembers” that made it the functional equivalent 
of a commercial enterprise.39 
In Ibister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc.,40 the California Su-
preme Court further extended the understanding of what might be con-
sidered a business establishment under the Unruh Act. There, girls 
sued after the Boys’ Club rejected their membership applications based 
on sex.41 The Boys’ Club, “a private charitable organization which oper-
ates a community recreational facility,”42 argued that it was not subject 
to the Unruh Act. The Club reasoned that, as a non-profit without an 
economic function, it should not be viewed as a “business establish-
ment” covered by the Unruh Act.43 The court disagreed, finding that the 
Club was primarily a “place of public accommodation or amusement” 
under the Unruh Act, as “relations with and among its members are of 
a kind which take place more or less in “public view,” and are of a “rel-
atively nongratuitous, continuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial sort.”44 
For the California Supreme Court, membership in the Boys’ Club was 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 896 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1995). 
 37 Id. at 789. 
 38 Id. at 790. 
 39 Id. at 793. 
 40 Ibister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 214. 
 43 Id. at 218. 
 44 Id. at 218. 
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“equivalent to admission to a place of public amusement,”45 which 
would have been covered by the previous public accommodations stat-
ute. A dissenting justice in Ibister cautioned that this reasoning would 
threaten “many traditionally sex-segregated institutions, such as fra-
ternities and sororities, private schools, and scouting organizations.”46 
The California Supreme Court responded to that dissent in Curran 
v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts47 by distinguishing those in-
stitutions, which it viewed as truly private, from the case in Ibister. The 
Boy Scouts in that case denied a leadership position to a gay man, who 
sued under the Unruh Act.48 Unlike the Boys Club, the California Su-
preme Court found that the Boy Scouts “is an organization whose pri-
mary function is the inculcation of a specific set of values in its youth 
members, and whose recreational facilities and activities are comple-
mentary to the organization’s primary purpose.”49 The Court argued 
that this was distinct from Ibister, as membership in the Boy Scouts is 
more than “simply a ticket of admission to a recreational facility that is 
open to a large segment of the public and has all the attributes of a place 
of public amusement.”50 
Similarly, the California Supreme Court determined in Doe v. Cal-
ifornia Lutheran High School Association51 that a private all boys high 
school was not a business establishment for purposes of the Unruh Act 
as its primary function was not commercial but instead “an expressive 
social organization whose primary function was the inculcation of val-
ues in its youth members.”52 In both this case and Curran, the court 
found that some business activities with nonmembers would not make 
the Boy Scouts or the high school business establishments as under 
Warfield because the transactions with nonmembers “do not involve the 
sale of access to the basic activities or services offered by the organiza-
tions.”53 Whereas in Warfield the country club sold to nonmembers ac-
cess to the services provided members, the Boy Scouts or high school 
sales of goods to nonmembers is distinct. That is, while the Boy Scouts 
sold goods to nonmembers through its stores, it did not sell “entry to 
pack or troop meetings, overnight hikes, the national jamboree, or any 
portion of the Boy Scouts’ extended training and educational process.”54 
 
 45 Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 952 P.2d 218, 237 (Cal. 1998). 
 46 Ibister, 707 P.2d at 226 (Mosk, J. dissenting). 
 47 Curran, 952 P.2d at 237. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 236. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Doe v. Cal. Lutheran High Sch. Assn., 170 Cal. App. 4th 828, 838 (2009). 
 52 Id. at 838 (citing Curran, 952 P.2d at 238). 
 53 Curran, 952 P.2d at 238 (emphasis in original). 
 54 Id. 
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The California Supreme Court noted that the nonmember transactions 
(at sporting events or through the retail stores) would be subject to the 
Unruh Act.55 
A California Court of Appeals found a local rotary club to be a busi-
ness establishment subject to the Unruh Act in Rotary Club of Duarte 
v. Board of Directors.56 In that case, two women and a local rotary club 
charged that the male-only policy of the International Rotary Club vio-
lated the Unruh Act after the International Rotary Club revoked the 
local club’s charter for its policy of admitting women.57 There, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals looked to the commercial aspects of the Rotary 
Club, the business benefits it offered to members, and the public nature 
of the community services done by Rotary members.58 In determining 
that the Rotary was not a private organization exempt from the Unruh 
Act, the Court of Appeals concluded that “[t]he relationship among Ro-
tarians is not continuous, personal and social.”59 The Supreme Court 
affirmed this decision, finding that “rather than carrying on their activ-
ities in an atmosphere of privacy, [Rotary Clubs] seek to keep their win-
dows and doors open to the whole world.”60 
The defendants in that case further alleged that disallowing its 
male-only policy infringed upon their rights to freedom of expressive 
association under the Constitution.61 However, that the “the male-only-
membership policy [was] valued by a substantial majority of Rotarians 
throughout the world and . . . ha[d] enabled the organization to work 
effectively on a worldwide basis” did not persuade the Court of Ap-
peals.62 The United States Supreme Court addressed this question after 
the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review.63 The 
United States Supreme Court found that the Unruh Act did not violate 
the First Amendment rights of the Rotary Club by forcing them to admit 
women.64 The Unruh Act did not violate the Rotary Clubs right to ex-
pressive association because admitting women to the Clubs would not 
“affect in any significant way the existing members’ ability to carry out 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. of Dirs., 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035 (1986), aff’d Bd. of Dirs. of 
Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 1058. 
 59 Id. at 1059. 
 60 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 547, quoting 1 Rotary Basic Library, Focus on Rotary 
60–61 (1981) (internal quotations omitted). 
 61 Id. at 1060. 
 62 Rotary Club of Duarte, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1060. 
 63 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 543. 
 64 Id. 
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their various purposes.”65 Further, the Court found that even should 
the members suffer a small infringement in their rights to expressive 
association, it was “justified because it serve[d] the State’s compelling 
interest in eliminating discrimination against women.”66 
B.  Ladies’ Night Discounts and Men’s Early Claims of Sex Discrimi-
nation under the Unruh Act 
Whereas in the past women seeking access to establishments that 
catered to men brought the majority of sex-discrimination claims under 
the Unruh Act, more recently, men have also brought claims under the 
Act against businesses or organizations that host women’s only events 
or provide discounts for women.67 Once established that the discrimina-
tion takes place in a “business establishment,” the act forbids “all un-
reasonable, arbitrary, or invidious discrimination.”68 California courts 
have found this discrimination “where the policy or action emphasizes 
irrelevant difference between men and women or perpetuates any irra-
tional stereotypes.”69 
In Koire v. Metro Car Wash,70 the plaintiff successfully brought 
claims under the Unruh Act against several car washes and nightclubs 
that offered discounts to women.71 The defendants in that case tried to 
argue that the sex-based discount policies were not “arbitrary” in viola-
tion of the Act as they were motivated by “substantial business and so-
cial purposes.”72 Further, one defendant nightclub argued that its La-
dies’ Night promotions encouraged more women to come to the bar, 
“thereby promoting more interaction between the sexes,” which it con-
sidered a “socially desirable goal.”73 The California Supreme Court dis-
agreed that this was a sufficient policy interest warranting an exception 
to the Act, distinguishing it from “the compelling societal interest in 
ensuring adequate housing for the elderly which justifies differential 
treatment based on age.”74 Instead, it maintained that a business’s eco-
nomic interest would not be enough to warrant an exception.75 
 
 65 Id. at 548. 
 66 Id. at 549. 
 67 Gale, supra note 6. 
 68 Cohn v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401 (2008). 
 69 Id. at 404 (internal quotations omitted). 
 70 40 Cal. 3d 24 (1985). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 32. 
 73 Id. at 33. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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Considering damages, the defendants further raised the argument 
that the plaintiff was not injured by the price differences.76 The court 
however stated that “by passing the Unruh Act, the Legislature estab-
lished that arbitrary sex discrimination by businesses is per se injuri-
ous.”77 Statutory damages are provided under the Act for each violation 
“regardless of the plaintiff’s actual damages.”78 The California Supreme 
Court cautioned that “differential pricing based on sex may be generally 
detrimental to both men and women, because it reinforces harmful ste-
reotypes.”79 The court was critical of a Washington Supreme Court de-
cision on the same issue.80 The Washington Supreme Court had previ-
ously ruled that a Ladies’ Night promotion at a basketball game did not 
violate the state’s antidiscrimination law precisely because the male 
plaintiff in that case suffered no damages as a result.81 In Koire, the 
California Supreme Court favorably cited law review articles that dis-
cussed the danger in allowing legal systems to treat men and women 
differently.82 The court further chastised the Washington Supreme 
Court for “succumb[ing] to sexual stereotyping in upholding the Seattle 
Supersonics’ ‘Ladies’ Night,’” a decision in which it found that discounts 
for women were reasonable because “women do not manifest the same 
interest in basketball that men do.”83 According to the California Su-
preme Court, this kind of sexual stereotyping “is precisely the type of 
practice prohibited by the Unruh Act.”84 
The California Supreme Court upheld the understanding that ar-
bitrary discrimination was per se injurious under the Unruh Act in An-
gelluci v. Supper Club.85 In that case, another situation where a man 
was charged higher price for admission than women for entry into a 
nightclub, the court further held that plaintiffs did not have to affirma-
 
 76 Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 33. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 79 Id. at 34. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Maclean v. First Nw. Indus. of Am., Inc., 635 P.2d 683, 685 (Wash. 1981) (“RCW 49.60.030 
authorizes private actions for violations of the chapter, but only for the “actual damages sus-
tained.”). 
 82 Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 34–35 (“As long as organized legal systems, at once the most respected 
and most feared of social institutions, continue to differentiate sharply, in treatment or in words, 
between men and women on the basis of irrelevant and artificially created distinctions, the likeli-
hood of men and women coming to regard one another primarily as fellow human beings and only 
secondarily as representatives of another sex will continue to be remote.”). 
 83 Id. at 35, citing MacLean, 635 P.2d at 684. 
 84 Id. at 35. 
 85 158 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2007). 
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tively seek nondiscriminatory treatment in order to have standing un-
der the Unruh Act.86 In dicta, the court suggested that there may be 
constitutional or equitable relief available for a business facing abusive 
litigation under the Unruh Act.87 In that case, both the trial and appel-
late courts expressed concerns about the potential for abusive litigation. 
In the case, the defendant complained that the “plaintiffs made repeated 
unannounced visits to defendant’s business establishment in order to 
increase the statutory damages they could seek for multiple violations 
of the Act.”88 However, the court chose to leave it to the legislature to 
“determine whether to alter the statutory elements of proof to afford 
business establishments’ protection against abusive private legal ac-
tions and settlement tactics.”89 
A California appeals court similarly raised concerns about the po-
tential for abusive litigation in Cohn v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc.90 The 
court expressed a distaste for the repeat-player plaintiffs in the case, 
who it viewed as being involved in shake-down lawsuits.91 It upheld a 
Mother’s Day special at an Angels baseball game that gave away gift 
bags to all women over age eighteen.92 Rather than the kind of “arbi-
trary discrimination the Unruh Act is meant to protect,” the court found 
that the promotion was intended to honor mothers.93 Gender was a sec-
ondary consideration, as the goal was to provide gifts to mothers.94 
Providing gifts to all women in attendance, rather than attempting to 
find out which women at the game were mothers, was an acceptable 
method of giving gifts to mothers.95 Unlike in Koire, the promotion here 
was less egregious as it did not “emphasize an irrelevant difference, nor 
perpetuate an irrational stereotype.”96 
 
 86 Id. at 719. 
 87 Id. at 729. 
 88 Id. at 728 (emphasis in original). 
 89 Id. at 729. 
 90 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); (“No other fans complained about the giveaway, 
and Cohn’s complaint only came after he went to the game to deliberately generate his “injury.” 
Cohn’s complaint gathers further suspicion because Cohn, his friends, and his counsel have been 
involved in numerous of what have been characterized as “shake down” lawsuits. (E.g., Angelucci 
v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal. 4th 160, 178 [158 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2007)].) They proclaim 
themselves equal rights activists, yet repeatedly attempted to glean money from the Angels 
through the threat of suit. The Act is a valuable tool for protecting our citizens and remedying true 
injuries. We are not convinced the Angels’ tote bag giveaway was in any way unreasonable, arbi-
trary, or invidious discrimination.”) 
 91 Id. at 405. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 404–05. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Cohn, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 404. 
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C.  Recent Lawsuits Targeting Women-Only Events 
In California, several lawsuits in recent years have been brought 
by male plaintiffs against women’s empowerment organizations alleg-
ing violations of the Unruh Act. Because these lawsuits have settled 
without judicial opinion, it is unclear how California courts might deal 
with these charges. Apart from seeking statutory damages, many of 
these settlements require the organizations to change their admission 
policies.97 
Some of the events describe the need for women-only admission 
policies in order to provide safe spaces for women. In 2017, two men 
refused entry to her show “Girls Night In” sued comedian Iliza Shle-
singer.98 A comedy show at a theater, open to the public, that charges a 
fee for entry would clearly fall under the Unruh Act. In this case, the 
only limitation was based on gender. In the wake of breaking allega-
tions against Harvey Weinstein and Louis C.K., the event was mar-
keted as: 
[A] hybrid stand up show and interactive discussion between 
Iliza and the women in the audience aimed at giving women a 
place to vent in a supportive, fun and inclusive environment.99 
Shlesinger described the event as an opportunity for “women to get to-
gether, talk and laugh about the things we go through.”100 The com-
plaint charges against what it refers to as the defendants’ “War on 
Men,” comparing the admission policy “as being akin to the Montgom-
ery City Lines bus company in Montgomery, Alabama circa 1955.”101 
Although the plaintiff in this case withdrew the complaint without prej-
udice, the same attorney refiled the case as a putative class action in 
2018.102 The named plaintiff in the first case is named in the second, 
and the complaint is very similar to the original.103 
With regards to the alleged Unruh Act violations, the defendants 
requested that the court dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the 
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discrimination was “neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.”104 The defend-
ant argued that any discrimination did not perpetuate stereotypes or 
“emphasize irrelevant differences.”105 Instead, the defendants argued 
that the admissions policy served to create “a safe space for women to 
discuss issues uniquely facing this sector of society.”106 This purpose, 
the defendants argued, “would be hindered by the presence of men.”107 
The court denied the defendants’ demurrer, finding that it did not have 
enough information from the complaint to determine whether the ad-
mission policy emphasized irrelevant differences or perpetuated irra-
tional stereotypes.108 
Other organizations have focused on women’s networking and 
providing opportunities for women to meet and discuss realities they 
face in the workplace. These organizations attempt to address barriers 
women face, including sexual harassment, in spaces without men. The 
women’s empowerment organization Ladies Get Paid was sued for vio-
lations of Unruh after it held women-only “Ladies Get Drinks” events 
at California bars, which were also sued.109 Ladies Get Paid settled the 
lawsuit rather than risk potential bankruptcy.110 As the attorney rep-
resenting the organization said, “[i]f you are a young company, you are 
not going to test the merits. You are going to wind up paying the plain-
tiff to go away.”111 This is especially true because the Unruh Act pro-
vides for fee-shifting for prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases, creat-
ing a greater risk for defendants unsure about their chances in 
litigation.112 As a part of the settlement, it had to change its policy to 
allow men to attend their events.113 Similarly, a women’s networking 
group that held “Clinics and Cocktails” events to teach women golf was 
sold after settling a lawsuit alleging Unruh Act violations.114 
In 2018, the San Diego Fire Rescue Foundation cancelled a free, 
city-sponsored Girls’ Empowerment Camp meant to teach girls about 
firefighting after being threatened with suit for alleged violations of the 
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Unruh Act.115 The San Diego Fire Rescue Foundation started the camp 
in efforts to address the gender disparity among firefighters in the city, 
where women comprise only four percent of the department.116 The city 
of San Diego pulled funding for the camp after receiving a complaint 
letter from an attorney representing a man who wanted to enroll his 
son in the camp.117 Although originally cancelled, the mayor directed 
city staff to reschedule the event as planned, changing the event to in-
vite both boys and girls to participate in the Girls Empowerment 
Camp.118 
Some challengers have gone beyond events that actually exclude 
men to raise objections to events designed for or marketed towards 
women.119 Los Angeles craft beer company Eagle Rock Brewery was 
sued over their Women’s Beer Forum, a monthly event for women who 
are interested in beer.120 The event allowed men to attend, but it aimed 
to be a “space where the women would outnumber the men while dis-
cussing craft beer, a rarity.”121 One man filed a claim with California’s 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing after a staff member mis-
takenly told him the event was for women only when he emailed re-
questing a ticket.122 The Brewery settled with the man after the Depart-
ment told the Brewery that it believed the claim had merit.123 Brewery 
owner Ting Su regretted having to settle and continues to work to “elicit 
some form of change at the legislative level to minimize the exploitation 
of the Unruh Act by career plaintiffs.”124 
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III. COURTS SHOULD LOOK TO THE PURPOSE OF THE UNRUH ACT IN 
DECIDING THESE CASES 
When the legislature added sex as a protected category under the 
Unruh Act in 1974, people understood the move to be aimed at protect-
ing women.125 The Los Angeles Times ran an article titled “Women’s 
Rights Legislation—A Vintage Year,” in which it discussed the “land-
mark legislation in the field of women’s rights” the California legisla-
ture passed during the 1973–74 session.126 Jan Baran, of the California 
Commission on the Status of Women, described it as “the most produc-
tive and exciting in terms of women’s issues in the history of the 
state.”127 As discussed above, the law has expanded since that time. 
Still, it is perhaps troubling that groups with the same goals as the Un-
ruh Act are now being targeted by men for lawsuits charging discrimi-
nation. 
As of September 2019, no sex discrimination case against these 
women’s empowerment agencies has been decided by a California court. 
Some recent California cases have settled rather than face expensive 
litigation, suggesting possibly that the organizations did not feel that 
their cases were strong enough to prevail under California law. Yet, it 
is unclear exactly how the courts would apply the law to these cases. As 
discussed above, the Unruh Act seems pretty clear in its prohibitions 
against discrimination, and courts apply it liberally. In many respects, 
women’s empowerment agencies appear different from previous in-
stances of discrimination through “Ladies’ Night” promotions that were 
motivated purely by business interests. Organizations that seek to pro-
vide space for women to address sexual harassment or particular diffi-
culties women face in the workplace seem very different from those pro-
motions. It seems incongruous that courts would find that organizations 
focused on gender equality have violated antidiscrimination statutes. 
Indeed, this section argues that the purpose of the Unruh Act weighs 
against finding violations in these cases. 
In Rotary Club of Duarte,128 the appellate court discussed that the 
Unruh Act “must be construed in the light of the legislative purpose and 
design.”129 The court there maintained that “[i]n enforcing the command 
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of a statute both the policy expressed in its terms, and the object im-
plicit in its history and background, should be recognized.”130 Califor-
nia’s Unruh Act was drafted to address inequalities in society and the 
harms of discrimination.131 The California legislature has discussed 
how the Unruh Act’s protections go beyond the listed categories, as “the 
California Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Unruh Act 
in an expansive way.”132 Rather than limit its application to the catego-
ries explicitly in the text, the Legislature recognized that the courts 
have interpreted it as “cover[ing] all arbitrary and intentional discrim-
ination by business establishments.”133 That said, the legislature has 
added protected categories through amendments several times 
throughout the Unruh Act’s history. 
The California Supreme Court has stated that the Unruh Act is 
“clear and unambiguous.”134 In Koire, the California Supreme Court 
said that “[t]he express language of the Unruh Act provides a clear and 
objective standard by which to determine the legality of the practices at 
issue.”135 In that case, the sex-based price differentials clearly violated 
the “plain language of the Unruh Act.”136 However, that court left open 
that “a compelling social policy” might persuade the court to look be-
yond the statute’s text.137 
As seen above, the plain language of the Unruh Act provides ex-
tremely broad protections. On its face, the majority of the sex-segre-
gated events and programs mentioned above that have recently been 
charged with violating the Unruh Act seem to do so. The example of the 
girls’ empowerment camp might be distinct as it could be compared to 
sex-segregated schools or the Boy Scouts, which California courts have 
held not to violate the Unruh Act. Similarly, events like the Women’s 
Beer Forum that market themselves to women but do not actually ex-
clude anyone also do not violate the text of the Unruh Act. Attempting 
to create spaces for women, without excluding anyone based on pro-
tected characteristics, should not be made to be in conflict with the 
state’s antidiscrimination statute. 
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Beyond the text, the California Supreme Court consistently dis-
cusses the purpose of the Unruh Act in its decisions, taking into consid-
eration the legislative intent in drafting the statute.138 This interpreta-
tion has been used in cases to attempt to define “business 
establishment” in line with legislative intent. In determining that the 
Mother’s Day giveaway did not violate the Act, one California appellate 
court looked to the policy behind the Unruh Act in determining that the 
giveaway did not “emphasize an irrelevant difference, nor perpetuate 
an irrational stereotype.”139 A willingness to consider the purpose be-
hind the statute might help women’s empowerment organizations con-
vince courts that disallowing men is not “unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
invidious discrimination.”140 Organizations aimed at women’s empow-
erment or helping women get ahead in the work force have the goal of 
creating equality between men and women, in keeping with the spirit 
of the Unruh Act. Lawsuits bringing these organizations into conflict 
with the Unruh Act thus seem in tension with its purpose. 
One recent amendment to the Unruh Act, passed in 2005, added 
“sexual orientation” and “marital status” to the list of protected catego-
ries.141 The legislature started the amendment with the recognition 
that, “[e]ven prior to the passage of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Califor-
nia law afforded broad protection against arbitrary discrimination by 
business establishments.”142 The purpose of the Unruh Act was thus “to 
provide broader, more effective protection against arbitrary discrimina-
tion.”143 Legislators discussed how the addition of these protected char-
acteristics did not “break new ground in expanding the scope of protec-
tion provided by the Act.”144 This is because the California Supreme 
Court “has rejected the argument that the Unruh Act’s ban on discrim-
ination reaches only the classifications specified in the Act’s text.”145 
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The purpose in including these explicitly was to avoid litigation and 
“encourage better compliance with the law.”146 
It is unclear how a California court would view an argument that 
excluding men from women’s empowerment events is not arbitrary dis-
crimination. In the case Easebe Enterprises v. Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Appeals Board,147 the defendant tried to argue that excluding men 
from a show featuring male dancers was not arbitrary discrimination 
as prohibited by the Unruh Act.148 The defendant nightclub argued that: 
[C]hanging social perspectives recognize that in some situations 
a policy founded on gender-based discrimination is consistent 
with everyday realities and in fact inures to the benefit of those 
who have been the victims of past societal and legal discrimina-
tion.149 
The California Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control’s decision to revoke the club’s license for its 
discriminatory practice.150 It said that the argument that the practice 
of excluding men was “benignly inspired” was not enough to create an 
exception to the Unruh Act as a matter of law in this case.151 It stated 
that it was not “within the purview of an intermediate appellate court, 
at this late date, to substitute its perspective for that of the Depart-
ment.”152 That said, the court noted that “were we the triers of fact, or 
were we writing on an entirely clear slate, we might find such theory 
persuasive.”153 However, the court felt restricted by the judgment pre-
viously made by the Department. This suggests that, given a clean 
slate, a court may be willing to accept a women’s empowerment organ-
ization’s claim that its policy of excluding men should be exempt from 
the Unruh Act on these grounds. Or, as discussed below, this logic might 
be more cleanly adopted through a legislative exemption to the Unruh 
Act. 
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IV. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION AND 
PERPETUATING GENDER STEREOTYPES 
As discussed above, California courts state one purpose of sex-dis-
crimination bans is a concern that they perpetuate irrational stereo-
types. This is taken from Supreme Court Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection understanding of sex discrimination, which has traditionally 
focused on eradicating stereotypes. Although these events are held by 
private actors, the Supreme Court’s discussion of sex discrimination by 
state actors in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment can provide some insight into how courts should 
consider these issues. California courts should follow the Supreme 
Court in deciding whether discrimination is arbitrary (in violation of 
the Unruh Act) based on whether the organizations’ policies are 
founded on gender stereotypes. 
In United States v. Virginia,154 the Supreme Court held that Vir-
ginia Military Institution’s (VMI) categorical exclusion of women denied 
them equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.155 
The Supreme Court discussed that, in order to defend gender-based 
state action, the state would have to show “at least that the [challenged] 
classification serves important governmental objectives and that the 
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.”156 The Court said that sex classifica-
tions by government actors would be allowed in some cases in order to, 
for example, “compensate women for particular economic disabilities 
[they have] suffered . . . promote equal employment opportunity . . . ad-
vance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s peo-
ple.”157 They would not be allowed, however, “to create or perpetuate 
the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”158 In both this case 
and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,159 the Court high-
lighted that single-sex policies may not be based on stereotypes.160 That 
is, classifications must avoid “fixed notions concerning the roles and 
abilities of males and females.”161 The Supreme Court highlighted that 
this distinction is important in order to avoid “perpetuat[ing] historical 
patterns of discrimination.”162 
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As discussed in the debate between the California and the Wash-
ington Supreme Courts, California courts similarly forbid single-sex 
policies that are based on irrational stereotypes. Unlike older “Ladies’ 
Night” promotions that California courts have seen as focusing on arbi-
trary distinctions between men and women and thus advancing irra-
tional stereotypes of women, women’s empowerment organizations do 
not seem to evoke the same ideas. Instead, organizations that coach 
women to ask for higher salaries or offer space to discuss experiences 
with sexual harassment would work to combat stereotypes women face 
in their workplaces. Under this understanding, the situations in the 
new cases mentioned above would not violate the Unruh Act. 
This can be a complicated argument because, as one California Ap-
peals Court discussed, “few cases have held discriminatory treatment 
to be nonarbitrary based solely on the special nature of the business 
establishment.”163 The examples the court gave were limited: (1) a gam-
bling club’s exclusion of one individual woman who was found to be a 
compulsive gambler;164 and (2) a cemetery’s exclusion of “punk rockers” 
from a private funeral at the request of the deceased’s family.165 The 
court discussed that the exceptions are generally only allowed “when 
there is a strong public policy in favor of such treatment.”166 There, the 
court cited examples of excluding minors from bars and ensuring afford-
able housing for the elderly.167 
The court left open that there “may also be instances where public 
policy warrants differential treatment for men and women,” discussing 
sex-segregated facilities like restrooms justified by a right to personal 
privacy.168 The court suggested that even some sex-based price differ-
entials may be warranted by a “compelling social policy.”169 Further, it 
stated that public policy can occasionally be gleaned from viewing other 
statutory enactments.170 A women’s networking organization may be 
able to point to statutes like the Equal Pay Act to suggest that public 
policy supports efforts to close the gender pay gap. Insofar as these or-
ganizations seek to equal the playing field between men and women, 
they do not seem to advance irrational stereotypes against women. The 
California legislature, spurred by the #MeToo Movement, further 
passed several laws that took effect January 1, 2019, to combat sexual 
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harassment.171 Jennifer Barrera, executive vice president with the Cal-
ifornia Chamber of Commerce, recognized this explicitly, stating, “#Me-
Too was a dominating topic at the Capitol this year.”172 These statutory 
enactments give more weight to women’s empowerment organizations’ 
claims that their goals are supported by a “compelling social policy.” 
This distinction would also combat the possibility of historically privi-
leged groups attempting to discriminate against historically marginal-
ized groups, as there will not be the same compelling social policy. 
V. LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES: EXCEPTIONS FOR HISTORICALLY 
MARGINALIZED GROUPS 
As it stands, women-only organizations have a difficult time of 
avoiding the Unruh Act in California. Courts can read the law narrowly 
to avoid applying the Unruh Act to events that are designed for or mar-
keted towards women, but that do not exclude men. Beyond that, it is 
not obvious that a solution like the one the Supreme Court in Washing-
ton gave in MacClean, of requiring the plaintiff to prove damages, 
would be better. The flexibility of the Unruh Act allowed it to expand to 
cover protected characteristics (like gender identity or sexual orienta-
tion) that were not considered by the legislators drafting it. Allowing 
that discrimination is per se injurious under California law and having 
statutory damages encouraged the filing of civil rights lawsuits in order 
to benefit the society as a whole. Rather than changing that jurispru-
dence, which could limit the Unruh Act’s application in other situations, 
the legislature could act to carve out an exception for these organiza-
tions. 
If legislatures want to leave space for these types of events, they 
could carve out exceptions in their Civil Rights Laws. One potential way 
to distinguish between whether groups are in line with the laws or not 
could be to analyze the power dynamics. As an example, under the Ca-
nadian Human Rights Code: 
It is not a discriminatory practice for a person to adopt or carry 
out a special program designed to prevent disadvantages that 
are likely to be suffered by, or to eliminate or reduce disad-
vantages that are suffered by, any group of individuals when 
those disadvantages would be based on or related to the prohib-
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ited groups of discrimination by improving opportunities re-
specting goods, services, facilities, accommodation or employ-
ment in relation to that group.173 
As an example of a “special program” thus protected, the Canadian Hu-
man Rights Commission points out that the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women provides for tem-
porary “special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality 
between men and women.”174 Language like this would still prohibit ar-
bitrary discrimination while allowing historically marginalized groups 
to attempt to reduce disparities. An exception like this would likely pro-
tect networking and empowerment groups. It would also prevent his-
torically privileged groups from using the Unruh Act to attack women’s 
organizations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
One California appellate court expressed an aversion to finding vi-
olations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act in cases of what it was concerned 
were men “involved in numerous of what have been characterized as 
‘shake down’ lawsuits.”175 This is especially concerning given that the 
settlements mentioned above threaten to shut down the organizations 
completely. To the extent these laws are used as a tool to harass women 
or attempt to get money through the threat of a lawsuit, their applica-
tion to these types of organizations seems inherently in conflict with the 
laws. Especially given recent statutory enactments by the California 
legislature focused on helping women gain power in the workplace and 
eliminating sexual harassment, these organizations have a strong ar-
gument that they do not arbitrarily discriminate in violation of the Un-
ruh Act. In keeping with the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, the examples given above do not perpetuate 
stereotypes by excluding men. 
It is not clear the extent to which courts might accept an argument 
that organizations seeking to ameliorate gender inequality should be 
treated differently under the law than organizations that perpetuate 
inequality. This space could be filled by legislative efforts to provide ex-
emptions for these organizations, focusing on power dynamics and his-
torically marginalized groups. Given that the majority of these organi-
zations have chosen to settle their cases rather than face potentially 
devastating legal fees, a legislative carveout might be needed. 
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As one California court of appeals reasoned, “[t]his important piece 
of legislation provides a safeguard against the many real harms that so 
often accompany discrimination. For this reason, it is imperative we not 
denigrate its power and efficacy by applying it to manufactured inju-
ries. . . .”176 Limiting its application to cases of arbitrary discrimination 
that perpetuate stereotypes would serve to better meet the goals of the 
Unruh Act itself. 
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